Volume One: To Him — Episode 6 | A podcast by Intend to Relate
Your next move takes place among other people’s choices.
You can decide what to offer, what to ask, and what you are willing to undertake. What happens next also depends on the people you encounter: their intentions, their available choices, and what they consider worth pursuing.
This episode returns to the inquiry into power that introduced Vincent the Videogamer and Paul the Promoter. It opens a further question: how do we understand a situation in which the value of our own choice depends on what someone else chooses?
The starting point is a familiar movie scene. From there, the discussion moves toward agreements, intangible value, and the priorities our actions reveal.
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A bar scene and a question about cooperation
In A Beautiful Mind, Russell Crowe’s John Nash considers what might happen if every man in his group approaches the same woman. They could get in one another’s way, while their later approaches to her friends could be received as attempts to settle for a second choice.
His proposed solution is to coordinate: leave the woman everyone initially noticed alone and approach her friends.
The episode uses that proposal to open a question about keeping an agreement.
Suppose everyone else follows the plan. One participant now sees an opportunity to depart from it. If he expects a better outcome by approaching the woman while the others stay away, the proposal contains an incentive to deviate.
The group’s preferred arrangement and that individual’s preferred move may come apart.
That is the difficulty the episode wants us to notice.
What a Nash equilibrium tells us
A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies in which no player can improve their own payoff by changing only their own strategy while the others’ strategies remain fixed.
The condition concerns the options and payoffs in the specified game. It asks whether anyone has a better unilateral move available.
Applied to the bar example, the conclusion depends on an assumption: approaching the woman must actually offer the deviating participant a higher expected payoff than keeping the arrangement. Under that assumption, the proposed arrangement fails the equilibrium test.
The scene does not establish everyone’s preferences or guarantee anyone’s success. A fuller account would also include the women as decision makers with their own intentions and choices. The men can coordinate their approaches; the outcomes still depend on other people’s participation.
This gives us a useful distinction: agreeing on a plan does not, by itself, establish that each person’s best response is to keep it.
What makes an agreement worth keeping?
An agreement can give people something they want to create together. It can also leave them facing an attractive opportunity to depart from what they promised.
That brings us back to familiar relational questions. What do we value about the arrangement? What would we gain by departing from it? What might we lose? What do we understand the other person to be relying upon?
Keeping a promise, preserving trust, enjoying future cooperation, and maintaining one’s own integrity may all matter to the people involved. An immediate opportunity is only part of what they may be assessing.
Cooperation can also satisfy the Nash-equilibrium condition when keeping the arrangement is each participant’s best response. The partnership example in MIT’s strategic-form lecture illustrates this possibility. The relevant question is how the actual incentives fit together.
For relationship agreements, that directs attention toward both the proposed terms and the reasons people have to participate in them.
Players, moves, and payoffs
The episode introduces three elements for a simple strategic model:
|
Element |
The relational question |
|
Players |
Who is making decisions that affect what happens? |
|
Moves |
What can each person actually choose or do? |
|
Payoffs |
How does each person value the possible outcomes? |
That structure brings the earlier power discussion with it.
Your available moves depend on your actual capacities and circumstances. You may be able to make an invitation, ask a question, offer time, propose an arrangement, or leave. Other people make their own decisions in response.
Paul’s distinction between “I can ask” and “I can decide” remains relevant. So does Vincent’s need to discover what his girlfriend wants from a shared life. Understanding the choices available to you includes understanding where another person’s choice begins.
What counts as a valuable outcome?
The episode’s “different currencies” metaphor returns us to intangible value.
One person may give particular weight to time. Another may focus on financial cost. Another may care most about the experience of being chosen. Meaning, dignity, pleasure, peace, and connection can also enter the assessment.
Standard game theory already allows people to have different preferences and different payoff functions. Its models do not require everyone to value outcomes in the same way. MIT’s introductory game-theory notes make differing preferences part of the analysis.
The practical difficulty is discovering and communicating what the actual participants value.
Consider a hypothetical evening together. One person thinks an expensive plan communicates care. The other most wants unhurried attention. Both may be making an effort, while each has only partly understood what the other would find valuable.
The questions become more precise: what does this outcome give you? What does it cost? Which part matters? What am I assuming matters to the other person?
The earlier invitation to quantify and articulate intangible values helps us examine those questions. A number can supply a reference point. The work also requires language for what the number leaves difficult to express.
Power, competing values, and the rules we claim
The episode points ahead to several connected inquiries: the value of time, meaning and dignity as payoffs, the scope of our power, and how we rank values when they conflict.
It also asks a more personal question:
Is a rule you say you live by really your rule? Or is it just an aspiration you haven’t tested yet?
An easy situation may leave a principle untested. A conflict among things we value can make the practical meaning of that principle more visible.
Choices give us evidence to examine. We still need to consider what options were available, what the person believed, and what circumstances shaped the decision. A single action does not explain an entire person.
That is where the inquiry goes next: toward a clearer account of what we intend, what we can do, what we value, and what we choose when those considerations pull in different directions.
For now, carry a question into the next encounter:
What move am I considering, what outcome do I expect, and what am I assuming the other person values?
Key Ideas
- Your choice interacts with other people’s choices. Their intentions and available responses belong in the assessment.
- Agreement and equilibrium describe different things. An agreement sets out shared terms of participation; the equilibrium test examines whether anyone can benefit from a unilateral change.
- Cooperation depends on the actual incentives. People may value trust, integrity, future participation, and the shared outcome itself.
- Moves connect game theory to power. Ask what each participant can actually do in the relevant circumstances.
- Payoffs can include intangible value. Time, meaning, dignity, and the feeling of being chosen may matter differently to different people.
- Keep inquiry open when values conflict. Actions provide evidence about priorities that should be interpreted alongside options, beliefs, and circumstances.
Full Transcript
Prepared from the episode’s automatically generated transcript and lightly edited for punctuation, readability, and apparent transcription errors. Speaker labels have been removed, and paragraph breaks, section headings, and navigation timestamps have been added. The spoken account is preserved. Two separately labeled editorial notes clarify the game-theory claims discussed in the accompanying article.
00:00 — Returning to power
Welcome back to Volume 1: To Him, a podcast by Intend to Relate.
It's been a minute since we did an actual To Him podcast. It's been a busy month, though.
We left off looking at power and talking about two new characters, Vincent the Video Gamer and Paul the Promoter. And we will be coming back to them, and we certainly will be coming back to power—in fact, in a specific context.
But we're going to start this episode with a new character.
00:23 — John Nash and the bar scene
And this new character is a young man named John Nash.
In fact, at this time, John Nash is actually embodied by another man named Russell Crowe in the movie A Beautiful Mind.
If you've ever seen that, John Nash is at a bar with his friends. They're Ivy League guys, and a group of women walk in. And one of them is a beautiful blonde, and everyone starts giving her attention.
All the dudes want to go talk to the same chick.
And then Nash has all this brain stuff going on, and he realizes if they all go after her, they'll all get in each other's way. She'll probably turn them all down, and her friends won't be interested in anyone anymore as a second choice, so everybody might lose.
And so he says, “Guys, guys, no, I got a different plan. Nobody goes for the blonde. Everyone goes after her friends instead, and everyone will come out ahead.”
Great little movie moment, and it gets some things wrong.
And why it's wrong illuminates something for us.
01:11 — Players, moves, and payoffs
Nash was one of the geniuses of game theory.
Game theory is the study of strategic decisions in situations where your best move depends on what other people choose.
Any game has three basic parts. Obviously, the players, which all of you guys are—you're the players.
There are the moves each player can make. Your moves.
And I'll tell you right now, those moves reveal something about what?
Power.
And there are the payoffs, meaning what each person could get from a potential outcome after making their move.
01:37 — Nash equilibrium and keeping the agreement
We're not going to get too technical on this right now, but we will look at the Nash equilibrium, which John Nash is famous for.
It's this idea, or a set of choices where, in the game, no one can do better by changing only their own move. Everyone is in the best response to everybody else.
So look back at the bar scene.
If all the dudes agree to ignore the blonde, what's the best move for one of those dudes? To go talk to her. No competition. They disappeared.
And every other guy at that table may be thinking, “Oh, well, this is my time,” if they weren't going to stick to the plan.
So that plan that Nash proposes in the bar is not a Nash equilibrium.
It only works if everyone trusts each other enough. They keep the deal, even when each person is tempted to break it.
And that's not a bar problem. That's a relationship problem.
Some of the best outcomes in life are going to depend on agreements that each of us, or each party, is tempted to break.
Editorial clarification on the bar example: This conclusion assumes a better expected payoff from departing while others keep their strategies. Cooperation can itself meet the Nash-equilibrium condition; trust alone does not settle the question.
02:22 — Game theory and relational value
Now, why does this matter for relating and intending to relate?
We're not here to turn love into a math equation.
Since the beginning of this podcast, To Him, we've been trying to give you tools for your toolkit, not homework to skip dates over and stay in studying.
So once you start looking through the eyes of game theory—and some of you may already be familiar with it—it can seem somewhat intuitive once you see it.
You see games everywhere, each person making moves and each trying to read the others and get the payout.
But here's the twist: classic game theory assumes everyone is keeping score with the same points, the same dollars, the same currency, but we know in real life we almost never are.
Editorial correction at 02:46: Game theory allows each player a distinct utility or payoff function, including nonmonetary values. It does not require a common currency. The useful relational question is what each person values. Technical reference.
We earlier discussed the base economic value of your time, but we also discussed the intangible values and identifying all those different types of intangible values and quantifying them.
One person is scoring in time. One person is scoring in dollars. One person is scoring in the feeling of being chosen.
Two people, three people in the same relationship can be scoring that same game with completely different currency.
03:17 — Where the inquiry goes next
Over the next few episodes, we're going to build this out.
This is going to take a couple of them, but I'm telling you, the concepts in here, as applied, as understood and seen in the world, they are worth the time and the effort to really understand.
We'll talk about the value of time.
We'll look back at the intangibles, like meaning and dignity, and how they are real payoffs.
And we'll ask what power actually means—not power in general, but the power to do what?
We'll look at how values rank when they conflict and you can't have everything.
Well, that's the hard question.
Is a rule you say you live by really your rule? Or is it just an aspiration you haven't tested yet?
Because in the end, the move you make, the choice reveals what you value when you realize that payoff.
Until next time, y'all be free and be good to each other, intentionally.
Related Concepts
The Power Position of Self-Valuation; actual capacity and available moves; strategic interdependence; Nash equilibrium; cooperation and agreements; individual payoffs; intangible value; conflicting priorities; rules and aspirations.
For the earlier discussion of economic and intangible value, see Heuristics of Confidence and the Default Rule of Assessment.
Technical References
- MIT OpenCourseWare — Strategic Form Games, Asu Ozdaglar. For individual utility functions, nonmonetary payoffs, the Nash-equilibrium condition, and a partnership example with cooperative equilibrium.
- MIT OpenCourseWare — Introduction to Economic Applications of Game Theory. For strategic choices, differing preferences, available actions, and beliefs about other participants.
Join the Conversation
What is one thing you value in a relationship that someone else might overlook because they are paying attention to a different kind of payoff?
About To Him
To Him is the podcast accompanying the development of the forthcoming first volume of the Intend to Relate canon. It speaks directly to men and welcomes everyone interested in the inquiry. Explore Volume One: To Him.
Intend to Relate develops a philosophy and toolkit for approaching relationships intentionally: understanding ourselves, articulating aims, encountering other people’s intentions, and giving participation a more deliberate form.
Become a free member for updates and access to Relationship Agreements and Conflicting Understandings: A Primer in the member Library.
Content note: Frank discussion of adult relationships. Philosophical and educational commentary, not individualized legal, medical, or mental-health advice. Relationship agreements do not replace ongoing consent.
Published by Intend2Relate, LLC.
Intention today. Awareness tomorrow. Freedom forever.
Be free, and be good to each other - intentionally.